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Safeguarding, Surveillance and Control: School Policy and Practice Responses to the Prevent 
Duty and the ‘war on terror’ in the U.K.    
Necla Acik, Jo Deakin and Bob Hindle 
Introduction 
Moves towards heightened school security supported by the introduction of numerous 
surveillance technologies have been reported globally (see Taylor, this volume) and this 
international trend towards hyper-securitisation continues to gather pace as further risks are 
highlighted. In the U.K., the recent ‘war on terror’ has provided the context for new hyper-
vigilant, hyper-securitised school practices, dictated by the government and carried out by 
school staff. These have resulted in new forms of school control, involving increased 
monitoring and surveillance, aimed at preventing young people from being drawn into 
terrorism. ‘Prevent’, the preventative strand of the U.K. Counter Terrorism Strategy 
(CONTEST), places a duty on staff in schools and further education colleges to identify and 
report radicalised and extremist behaviour amongst students (HM Government, 2011; 2015). 
In order to fulfil this duty schools have been required to adopt new security and surveillance 
policies and procedures, teachers have taken on new monitoring and reporting roles, and 
students have been subjected to increased levels of monitoring and surveillance. These 
processes form part of the wider securitisation of school practices, and continue the trend 
towards heightened control of stigmatised groups (Thomas, 2016).   
Critics argue that Prevent: integrates counter-terrorism legislations and policies into 
educational institutions and, in so doing, contributes to the increased securitisation of 
education in the U.K. (Thomas, 2016; Davies, 2016; O’Donnell 2016); legitimises the 
regulation and social control of young Muslims in schools (Miah, 2017; Coppock and 
McGovern, 2014); encourages the construction of ‘suspect communities’ (Heath-Kelly, 2013; 
Awan, 2012; Patel, 2017); and acts as a mechanism of exclusion that represses rather than 
encourages debate in schools (Deakin and Acik, 2017), paying little attention to the views of 
the young people it was designed to address (Heath-Kelly, 2013). 
In this chapter we review the available literature to provide a critical analysis of how the 
Prevent duty is unfolding in schools. In the following sections we provide a critique of some 
key, and often controversial, aspects of the Prevent policy, from its introduction in schools, 
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through to its implementation and outcomes. Research is limited, particularly in relation to 
students’ experiences of the strategy, but, we review the existing evidence to provide some 
insights, as far as possible, into how Prevent has been received by teachers and students, its 
impact on the working practices of teachers, and the experiences of students and local 
communities subject to Prevent policy and practice. In so doing we raise questions about the 
implications of the Prevent strategy, in particular the heightened measures of security and 
surveillance, for teachers, students and communities.  
Our critique is structured around the following key aspects of the Prevent duty as it unfolds 
in schools:  
1. The conceptual issues surrounding Prevent, including: its positioning within 
the broader framework of student safeguarding and risk management; developing 
working definitions of extremism and identifying signs of radicalisation. 
2. The implementation of the Prevent duty, including: staff training; information 
sharing; promoting fundamental British values; monitoring external influences; and 
making referrals.  
 
Background to Prevent 
The Prevent programme was introduced to tackle the problem of ‘home grown terrorism’, 
and to prevent young people from being drawn into terrorism (HM Government, 2015a). The 
programme covers all levels of education, from pre-school to higher education institutions, 
as well as public health bodies, local authorities, police and prisons. The policy was initially 
rooted in communities in an effort to encourage a closer cooperation between local 
authorities, community groups and the Office for Security and Counter-terrorism, but after 
almost a decade of turbulence the Government revised the programme in 2011 (HM 
Government, 2011), reducing the community focus and, in July 2015, making it a statutory 
duty for public bodies to comply. This has put a legal obligation on schools and colleges (along 
with other specified authorities) to have policies and procedures in place, firstly, to identify 
and record early signs of radicalisation among children and young people and, secondly, to 
refer identified individuals to the de-radicalisation programme, Channel. The policy is 
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designed to deal with ‘a range of terrorism threats’ (HM Government, 2011) and yet has, from 
inception, taken risks of Islamic extremism as its main focus (Thomas, 2016). 
Compliance with the duty for schools and further education is monitored by The Office for 
Standards in Education, Children's Services and Skills (Ofsted). Ofsted places a strong 
emphasis on safeguarding, with specific reference to Prevent, to ensure that schools, colleges 
and further education have effective policies in place to ‘to promote pupils’ welfare and 
prevent radicalisation and extremism’ (Ofsted, 2015). Prevention of radicalisation is a new 
element of the safeguarding agenda, requiring additional policies to be devised and 
implemented, and constituting an additional policy and practice obligation for many schools. 
The Prevent framework, monitored by Ofsted, expects schools to take a pro-active role in 
ensuring that their students are safe, by rigorous evaluation of their policies and practices. 
Ofsted expect schools to raise awareness of any potential indicators of radicalisation on a 
regular basis and school leaders and governors are required to provide evidence of the 
measures they have undertaken (including reporting concerns about individuals and 
promoting ‘fundamental British values’. The list of indicators of radicalisation can vary from 
school to school and are defined by schools with some generic guidance offered by the U.K. 
Government – this is discussed in detail below. The framework makes it clear that inadequate 
implementation of the duty will be taken seriously and “could lead to governance and 
leadership change, restructuring or even dissolution under the Secretary of State’s reserve 
powers.” (HM Government, 2015a) 
The Prevent duty has been controversial in a number of ways, facing criticism from academics, 
schools and teachers’ unions, Muslim representative bodies, the media and politicians. Most 
significantly it has been perceived as ill-conceived and conceptually flawed, focussing on 
heavy surveillance of stigmatised groups (Kundnani, 2009; 2015; Heath-Kelly, 2012, 2013) 
rather than educating against extremism (Thomas, 2016; Sukarieh and Tannock 2015). For 
head teachers interpreting the policy, school staff carrying out the duty, and students on the 
receiving end, these conceptual issues shape their experiences of Prevent (Mythen et al. 
2012). Academic research has focussed on conceptual issues, policy interpretation, the 
impact of the strategy on young people and communities, and teachers’ attitudes. We include 
this research as well as findings from our own exploratory study of teachers’ and students’ 
daily experiences of school life since the introduction of the Prevent duty (Deakin and Acik, 
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2017)i. The following sections are structured around key aspects of the Prevent duty as it 
unfolds in schools. These are organised within two subsections: the conceptual issues 
surrounding Prevent; and the implementation of the Prevent duty. 
1. Conceptual issues surrounding Prevent 
 
The positioning of Prevent within school policy: safeguarding and risk  
All U.K. schools are subject to stringent safeguarding policies designed to protect vulnerable 
children from significant harms such as drug abuse, gangs, neglect and sexual exploitation 
(Parton, 2006). The U.K. Government states that the Prevent duty sits within these existing 
safeguarding policies (HM Government 2011; 2015a). However critics argue that there are 
several reasons why this positioning is problematic. 
From a socio-legal perspective, it would be difficult to argue that Prevent sits easily within 
current safeguarding policies. Prevent is rooted in the Counter-terrorism and Security Act 
2015, whereas the safeguarding policies are embedded within the Children Act 2004 and the 
2004 Green Paper Every Child Matters (DfES, 2004, Parton, 2006, 2010). These are very 
different policy areas responding to different political and social demands. The primary 
rationale behind child protection and safeguarding polices and legislation is to safeguard the 
‘best interests of the child’; counter-terrorism legislation, on the other hand, has a much 
wider scope for ensuring the safety of the public. Whilst the protection of young people who 
become radicalised is part of the counter-terrorism rationale, the legislation is concerned 
primarily with containing and eradicating threats to U.K. national security based on the logic 
of individual risk-reduction, This positions the child as a potential victim in need of protection 
and, at the same time, as a threat that poses a risk. Positioning Prevent as an extension to 
safeguarding policies assumes it fits with child welfare laws, policies and practices and is also, 
therefore, in ‘the best interests of the child’ (Davies, 2016; Durodie, 2016). This is clearly not 
the case for a child constructed as deviant under Prevent and managed as a potentially 
dangerous risk, and where intervention is likely to include heightened state surveillance 
rather than practical or emotional help (Stanley and Guru, 2015).  
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A further problem with the ‘safeguarding’ label, as debated extensively within the sociology 
of childhood literature, is that it constructs children as inherently vulnerable and in so doing 
provides legitimacy for any interventions deemed necessary (Coppock, 2014; Daniel 2010). As 
a result, the positioning of the Prevent duty within this framework of ‘protection’ creates a 
perfect storm of powerful legislative possibilities around any child caught up in a discourse of 
‘radicalisation risk’. With these elements in place it becomes very difficult to question the 
preventative practices that are put in motion around the child. Resulting interventions are 
likely to be seen as unproblematic or even as a moral imperative (Coppock, 2014; Daniel 2010, 
Parton 2010). The unquestioning nature of safeguarding policies raises particular problems 
for Prevent where the recipients of interventions are drawn from ‘suspect communities’ 
(Heath-Kelly, 2012). Coppock (2014; p123) argues that elementsii of the Prevent strategy 
construct young Muslims as ‘risky’, requiring monitoring, surveillance and “disciplinary 
normalisation… aimed at producing … ‘the enlightened, moderate Muslim’.”. Contradictions 
therefore exist between the undermining nature of Prevent policies, and interventions under 
the ‘safeguarding’ banner, on British Muslim children and their rights under the United 
Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child (Coppock, 2014; Durodie, 2016). 
For many critics, the Prevent duty has its feet firmly positioned in security rather than 
safeguarding in a process where measures of securitisation have replaced efforts to ensure 
cohesion (Thomas, 2014; Mythen et al. 2012). Within schools and communities, the focus on 
surveillance, monitoring and reporting of potential risks, and the promotion of British values 
have driven narratives of grievance and group division (Thomas, 2014; Davies, 2016; 
Panjwani, 2016; Busher at al. 2017).  Amongst students the effects of surveillance are well 
discussed (see for example, Taylor, this volume; Taylor, 2013; Saltman and Gabbard, 2003). 
The policies and practices of Prevent add a further level to the surveillance of all students, but 
particularly those from communities labelled as suspect (Thomas, 2016; Heath-Kelly, 2012). 
The problem of definition: Defining extremism and identifying risk 
Within the guidance documents issued to schools and colleges by the U.K. Government there 
appears to be considerable scope for interpretation in schools’ understanding of, and 
responses to, the Prevent duty. One obvious area of subjectivity arises in the lack of clear 
definition and collective understanding of the key terms: ‘radicalisation’, ‘extremism’, and 
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‘indicators of radicalisation’ (Githens-Mazer, 2012; Kundnani 2015; Richards, 2015). For a 
policy to be applied consistently in practice it is imperative that school staff at all levels 
understand, and agree upon, the meaning of key terms, and act upon these in a consistent 
way (Cole et al., 2012). When the terms are as complex, nuanced and context-dependent as 
those driving the Prevent strategy, achieving agreed-upon definitions becomes extremely 
difficult. 
The legislation defines  ‘radicalisation’ as “the process by which a person comes to support 
terrorism and extremist ideologies associated with terrorist groups” [HM Government, 2015a: 
12] and defines extremism as:  “vocal or active opposition to fundamental British values, 
including democracy, the rule of law, individual liberty and mutual respect and tolerance of 
different faiths and beliefs [including] calls for the death of members of our armed forces, 
whether in the UK or overseas” [HM Government, 2015a: 12] 
However, there is a level of subjective judgement required by teachers in deciding whether a 
student’s behaviour is based on extremist ideology (Busher et al., 2017). Consequently, the 
action that follows is “open to personal agency, either discriminatory or liberal” (Hindle, 2016, 
p3) raising important questions about our attitudes to the other and how these are 
determined.  
As part of the process of spotting signs of radicalisation, schools are required to have a 
Prevent risk assessment policy in place, providing details of possible indicators of extremist 
tendencies or radicalised behaviour. Due to the diversity in triggers, the Prevent duty and 
related departmental guidance avoid listing these indicators, instead permitting schools to 
develop their own context-specific list. Whilst this allows for local and institutional context to 
drive the identification of indicators, it also puts a significant pressure on schools to enforce 
something so complex and intangible that it eludes definition (Busher et al. 2017). 
Despite the lack of government guidance a number of potential indicators are listed in the 
DCSF (2008) Learning Together to be Safe toolkit with the caveat: “Staff will need to take into 
consideration how reliable or significant signs are and whether there are other factors or 
issues that could indicate vulnerability.” DCSF 2008; 34) 




• “Graffiti symbols, writing or art work promoting extremist messages or 
images. 
• Pupils accessing extremist material online, including through social 
networking sites. 
• Parental reports of changes in behaviour, friendship or actions and 
requests for assistance. 
• Partner schools, local authority services and police reports of issues 
affecting pupils in other schools. 
• Pupils voicing opinions drawn from extremist ideologies and narratives. 
• Use of extremist or ‘hate’ terms to exclude others or incite violence. 
“(DCSF 2008; 34) 
Not surprisingly, the indicators listed above are widely adopted by schools in their own risk 
assessment policy documents alongside indicators from other sources (HM Government, 
2012) including the Government’s Workshop to Raise Awareness of Prevent (WRAP) training, 
documents from other schools and local knowledge from related agencies. Thus the pool of 
‘signs of radicalisation’ can be extended in line with these external recommendations (Cole et 
al. 2012). The list is developed without public scrutiny or research-led evidence making these 
indicators subjective and problematic and increasing the likelihood of making false referrals 
(Kundnani, 2015; Heath-Kelly, 2012).   
The Ofsted (2016: 13) report on Prevent found that there are great variations in schools’ risks 
assessment policies ranging from very basic ‘checklist approach to compliance’ to very 
detailed policies that identify and address action plans to minimise the risk. An analysis of 
publically available school policy documents confirms this evaluation and shows that schools 
have incorporated their own understanding of risk factors. For example, the Arthur Mellows 
Village College’s (no date, p.2) Prevent risk assessment policy lists “showing a mistrust of 
mainstream media reports and belief in conspiracy theories” and “appearing angry about 
governmental policies, especially foreign policy” as signs of extremism and radicalisation. 
Other schools’ policy documents include “Anti-Western or Anti-British views” as signs of 
extremism (Bracknell Forest Council, 2015). There has also been confusion around the type 
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of political dissident activities or groups that might be considered as radical and extremist 
ranging from anti-fracking, hunt saboteur, animal rights activity to anti-Israeli/pro-Palestinian 
activities (Hooper, 2016, Hayhurst, 2016). These cases highlight the loose definition of 
radicalisation and extremism which can encompass controversial but legal forms of protest 
and activities.  
Clearly, there is confusion around what constitutes extremist ideology and the factors that 
indicate radicalised behaviour. Even the idea that there is a link between extremist ideas and 
violence is highly contested (Kundnani, 2015) and there is very little in the research literature 
to support such a link. Thus, the pre-crime logic of the Prevent strategy that uses risk factors 
to predict future terrorist behaviour comes into question here (Coppock and McGovern, 
2014). The Prevent training and the risk assessment policies in schools do little to clarify a 
workable position or any level of scrutiny, instead leaving definitions open to subjectivity and 
inconsistency, and presenting problems for open dialogue and the application of the policy 
into practice (O’Donnell, 2016). The following sections, discussing the application of Prevent 




2. Application of Prevent into practice 
A second area that warrants discussion is the application of the Prevent duty into practice. 
Many of the criticisms of Prevent practice presented in this section stem from the lack of 
clearly defined terms and agreed definitions: what do we mean by extremist behaviour? What 
exactly are we safeguarding from? What constitutes a ‘sign of radicalisation? Without any 
solid definitional foundations Prevent is essentially a policy built in sand, with each practice 
initiative sitting precariously on a moveable base (Deakin and Acik, 2017). 
Five main inter-related areas of concern are addressed here, these focus on: the training 
received by teachers and support staff in schools; information sharing within multi-agency 
groups; promoting fundamental British values; monitoring external influences; and making 
referrals. 
Staff training  
Staff training on Prevent is a requirement for all teachers and school support staff (including 
members of the governing bodies, temporary teaching staff and estate personnel). Training 
was initially delivered to leaders, managers and safeguarding officers but was later extended 
to include at least basic training for all staff and governors. The training is intended to enable 
staff to identify children at risk of radicalisation and understand appropriate follow-on 
procedures, from simple recording of information to making referrals to the government’s 
de-radicalisation programme, Channel. It is delivered in various ways from online support 
resources (see for example HM Government 2016) and an online ‘Workshop to Raise 
Awareness of Prevent (WRAP)’ to meet basic training needs, to the more tailored and detailed 
training delivered by Prevent coordinators and independent providers.  
A year after the introduction of the Prevent duty, the Home Office reported a high uptake in 
Prevent training (H.M. Government, 2017). However, despite the variety of training options 
available, there is disquiet amongst school staff, school leaders, inspectors and MPs about 
the availability, quality and appropriateness of the training. Whilst most teachers had 
received on-line training many had found it insufficient (Santry, 2016). Moreover, Ofsted 
(2016) identified an over-reliance on online training packages, such as WRAP, and expressed 
the need for more bespoke training for staff with different responsibilities as well as Prevent 
training linking more effectively to existing Safeguarding training (Ofsted 2016; 16-17).  
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Academic research on the effectiveness of staff training presents mixed views. While Busher 
et al (2017) found that the training was well received by most of their respondents, in our 
own research the training was criticized as superficial and inadequate leaving the staff-group 
feeling ill-prepared and confused (Deakin and Acik, 2017). In both studies it was clear that, 
where teachers did feel confident about managing potentially sensitive conversations, the 
training had not been a significant factor. Confidence was more likely to be expressed by 
those teaching subjects like Drama, Religious Education, Sociology and Citizenship Education, 
where ‘difficult discussions’ were the norm, as well as by more experienced teachers and 
those from Muslim backgrounds (Busher et al, 2017; Deakin and Acik, 2017) 
An important part of the training focuses on being able to spot signs of radicalisation in young 
people. The difficulties resulting from a lack of clearly defined terms have been discussed 
above and provide significant obstacles to effective staff training. In a parliamentary debate 
on Prevent, the Conservative MP Lucy Allan questioned the effectiveness of the training in 
helping staff to spot signs of radicalisation and expressed concern that schools apply their 
own definition of extremism leading to some subjective and confused referral scenarios:  
“From what I have seen, when schools look for signs of extremism, they do not really 
know what they are looking for. They often come up with suggestions for things that 
might be grounds for referral that have no possible connection at all to extremism. I 
have sat in governors’ meetings where teachers who want to comply have openly 
discussed scenarios such as a child coming into school and saying that he has been on 
a Fathers4Justice march or a march to protest against badger culls.” (Allan, 2017, no 
page) 
Coupled with problems of defining extremism and radicalisation, the lack of effective training 
presents significant barriers to the effective implementation of the Prevent strategy into 
practice (Deakin and Acik, 2017). Exactly where the training is failing, the extent to which it is 
deficient and the nature of teachers’ dissatisfaction are unclear and require further research. 
Adequate staff training remains a key concern of regulators and schools alike. The U.K. 
Government believes much of the criticism of Prevent can be traced back to a lack of 
adequate training and that once this is resolved Prevent will become more effective (House 




Information sharing within multi-agency partnerships  
For a long time schools and colleges have worked in partnership with a number of agencies, 
such as social services and Child and Adolescent Mental Health Services (CAMHS), and 
information has been shared in the interests of the child for the purposes of safeguarding (see 
Tucker and Trotman, this volume). However, the nature and extent of information sharing 
under the Prevent duty has been criticised as excessive (Coppock and McGovern, 2014; 
Kundnani, 2009). 
Prevent strategies rely on close communication between schools and a range of agencies 
working together in a multi-agency partnership. These include co-operation with existing 
agencies and bodies such as local authorities, Youth Offending Teams, The Police, Community 
Safety Partnerships, Local Safeguarding Children Boards (LSCBs), as well as with Channel 
panels and local and regional Prevent co-ordinators. The emphasis is on sharing information 
about students and their families, as well as sharing good practice in order to effectively 
implement the duty. This differs from the existing multi-agency partnership arrangements in 
two significant ways: 1. under Prevent, further agencies are involved in the partnership, for 
example local and regional Prevent co-ordinators and, 2.  additional information about 
students and their families is shared (Ofsted 2016; 10). 
The requirements to share information may be in conflict with schools’ existing confidentiality 
obligations under the Data Protection Act 1998 and sections of the Human Rights Act 1998 
concerning privacy.  This highlights a key mismatch that can occur between the state driven 
policies of Prevent and the teaching profession’s core values (Coppock and McGovern, 2014). 
A high degree of concern has been expressed by teachers at the extent of the information 
that must be collected, recorded and shared about the lives of young Muslims and Muslim 
communities (Coppock and McGovern, 2014; Kundnani, 2009). 
 
In recognition of this potential conflict, the Prevent duty reminds staff and the leadership 
team to consider “necessity and proportionality” when bypassing existing confidentially 
agreements and calls for caution to share personal information only “where it is strictly 
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necessary to the intended outcome and proportionate to it.” The guidance provides little 
insight into what type of information ought to be shared and leaves it to the ‘professional 
judgement’ of the school leaders to determine whether there are “risks to an individual or 
the public” which necessitates information gathering and sharing (HM Government 2015a, 
4). 
 
Human Rights and civil liberties groups have criticised Prevent for leaving parents and young 
people in the dark about the extent they are being monitored, the kinds of information being 
shared, the profiling of individuals and groups ‘at risk’ of radicalisation and the retention of 
data after a referral (Open Society Justice Initiative, 2016). Schools, too, have expressed 
concerns about their role in the surveillance and monitoring of students (see Rosen and 
Santesso, this volume, and Taylor, this volume for a wider discussion of monitoring, 
surveillance and privacy in schools). In cases where unsuccessful referrals are made and no 
further actions are taken, the individual will still be monitored by their school as part of on-
going risk assessment policies. Where a successful referral has been made, schools are 
required to store details in a Child Protection file, transfer the file to any new school or college 
or keep it until the child’s 25th birthday if the pupil has left education (Craven Pupil Referral 
Service, 2016). It is difficult to believe the notion that the best interests of the child are at the 
heart of this process of heavy surveillance and monitoring (Thomas, 2016). 
 
Promoting fundamental British values  
 
A parallel duty handed to schools under Prevent is to promote fundamental British values, 
through teaching and debate, as a way of building pupils’ resilience to radicalisation and 
challenging extremist views. Reinforcing democratic values at school and developing critical 
skills are seen as an important aspect of prevention of extremism and terrorism (Moghaddam 
2005; Davies, 2008). However, the teaching of fundamental British values has received 
criticism from Ofsted, practitioners and academics for several reasons:  the inconsistent 
standard of teaching; encouraging an ‘us-versus-them’ dichotomy; reducing community 
cohesion; and potentially impacting upon free speech. (Browne Jacobson and ASCL, 2016; 
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Thomas, 2016; Busher et al, 2017; Davies, 2016; Ofsted, 2016; Panjwani 2016; Richards, 
2015). 
 
The Ofsted report on Prevent (2016) found that although the promotion of British values had 
become an integral part of the curriculum, the quality of teaching of British values varied 
considerably. The report identified limited understanding and knowledge of British values 
amongst staff, and difficulties integrating British values into the curriculum (Ofsted 2016; 18).  
 
The School Leaders Survey (Browne Jacobson and ASCL 2016; 18) asked respondents about 
the challenges they faced in promoting British values. It concluded, “There is concern that 
using the label ‘British’ may alienate students and staff with another heritage, and has the 
potential to divide communities and people from different cultural backgrounds” (p18). 
Similarly, Busher at al. (2017) found that the promotion of fundamental British values was 
seen by most respondents as a problematic element of the Prevent duty in terms of 
definitions and process. Many expressed discomfort with the idea of British values, linking 
them to issues of imperialism, empire, exclusionary identities, and racism, and potentially 
repressing rather than encouraging engagement amongst students. This concern highlights a 
fundamental problem with the promotion of British values, and with the Prevent approach 
more generally: “The implication is always that ‘immigrants’ do not adhere to British values 
(whatever these are) and therefore represent a threat.” (Davies, 2016, p7). Ironically, this 
divisive narrative is the very thing Prevent had intended to uproot (see HM Government, 
2015).  
 
Moreover, with a few local exceptions such as Greater Manchester Police’s RadEqual 
schemeiii, the teaching of fundamental British values has largely replaced the community 
cohesion programmes intended to counter extremism in earlier versions of Prevent. The 
current version of Prevent does little to create community cohesion, focuses on schools and 
students and is in danger of alienating Muslim communities, labelling them as ‘suspect’ 
(Thomas, 2016; Coppock and McGovern, 2014; Heath-Kelly, 2012).  
 
Wider concerns about teaching British values in schools have been raised from different 
quarters including teachers, academics and think-tanks. They argue that reinforcing British 
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values in schools alongside the surveillance measures of Prevent will have a ‘chilling effect’ 
on free speech, particularly amongst Muslim students (Khan, 2016; Open Society Justice 
Initiative, 2016; Liberty, 2015). Some argue that students will withdraw from discussing 
radicalisation and extremism for fear of saying something that could link them with 
radicalised thinking or, in some way, raise teachers’ suspicions (Open Society Justice Initiative, 
2016; Khan, 2016).  
 
Our own research suggests that discussions are being stifled: students feared being 
safeguarded or sanctioned for ‘saying the wrong thing’, making a joke that could be seen as 
inappropriate, or expressing feelings of anger, and some provided examples  of sanctions 
being applied for these reasons. For example one boy was sanctioned for shouting ‘Allahu 
Akbar’ in an imitation of a suicide bomber, after hearing a loud noise outside the classroom. 
.Clearly, for students, expressing contentious issues, even as a joke, becomes very difficult 
whilst they are being monitored and the threat of referral is present (Deakin and Acik, 2017). 
Many teenagers explore extremist attitudes as part of their natural development and schools 
should be safe places where students feel free to express any opinion (however unpalatable), 
without fear of reprisal (Deakin and Acik, 2017). Young people, in developing their opinions 
and learning to challenge extremist views, need to be able to engage with political debate 
without being made to feel that “their opinions have to meet with official approval’ (Institute 
of Race Relations 2010: 79; Sukarieh and Tannock, 2015). Otherwise, young people’s 
developing perspectives “run the risk of being reconstructed within securitised adult and neo-
liberal discourses.” (McKendrick and Finch, p8) 
 
In response, the U.K. Department for Education (DfE) emphasise that the Prevent duty “does 
not intended to stop pupils debating controversial issues. On the contrary, schools should 
provide a safe space in which children, young people and staff can understand the risks 
associated with terrorism and develop the knowledge and skills to be able to challenge 
extremist arguments” (DfE 2015: 8-9). Resources are available (including Government 
toolkits, workshops and materials from external facilitators and voluntary sector 
organisations) to support teachers in managing debates about contentious issues and to help 




Teachers appear to be accessing these resources (Ofsted, 2015) but, despite the support, 
many were concerned about the effect of Prevent on the openness of discussions (Busher et 
al, 2017).  They expressed concerns that the requirement to report extreme views would 
alienate students, erode their trust and therefore have a repressive effect on classroom 
discussions (Deakin and Acik, 2017; Parton, 2010). There is still little evidence of any school-
based work that builds youth resilience against extremism (Thomas, 2016)  
 
Monitoring external influences 
IT policies 
There is an increasingly widespread recognition that terrorist and extremist organisations are 
utilising the internet and social media to recruit new followers and spread their message. 
Under Prevent, schools must demonstrate suitable filtering in place to avoid students 
accessing websites and materials deemed extremist. Incorporating Prevent policies into 
existing IT policies seems to be the least burdensome requirement of Prevent and most 
providers inspected by Ofsted have complied with it (Ofsted, 2016). Yet, the policies of 11 out 
of 37 educational providers were judged as ineffective: learners were able to bypass firewalls 
to access inappropriate websites including those promoting extreme Islamic ideology, right-
wing extremist and the purchase of firearms (Ofsted 2016; 19). Good practice found in schools 
included stringent monitoring of students’ internet activity, reporting to the police blocked 
websites that students had attempted to access, and ‘risk-rating’ students involving keeping 
a record of students who show signs of accessing blocked material (Ofsted 2016; 19). Schools 
are encouraged to contribute to intelligence gathering by keeping a watchful eye on pupils or 
groups of pupils that could potentially display signs of radicalisation and keep a record of 
them. These practices form part of the wider securitisation of school practices involving heavy 
surveillance of stigmatised groups (Thomas, 2016).  Importantly, these practices are not open 
to scrutiny or subject to independent evaluation; instead, they are, again, subject to the 
schools’ and practitioners’ personal judgement as to what should be considered extremist 
(Busher et al. 2017).   
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External speakers/ giving platform to extremists 
Under the Prevent Duty, schools and other public bodies must ensure that publicly-owned 
venues and resources do not provide a platform for extremists and are not used to 
disseminate extremist views. This means that schools and colleges have to have a process of 
vetting and monitoring external speakers in place. There are various approaches schools and 
FE institutions have taken to comply with this duty (157 Group, 2015). Some organisations 
have tried to mitigate the risk of any potentially controversial speaker by inviting another 
speaker to present an alternative view, and by monitoring the event closely. However, most 
have chosen not to invite controversial speakers due to the potential reputational damage 
that could ensue. Providers might also refuse a speaker on the grounds that although they 
might not say something controversial at the event, they could invite students to other events 
outside the school and thus pose a future risk to them (157 Group, 2015). The Ofsted (2016) 
report criticised the management of some schools for not having a clear oversight of external 
speakers and events. Examples of good implementation included liaising with ‘Prevent’ 
coordinators and the police to gather background information on speakers before organising 
an event and sharing the information with partners (Ofsted 2016; 14). 
Working definitions of extremism are contested. While Government publications are carefully 
worded, policy documents published in relation to Prevent by educational providers can 
differ. The Arthur Mellows Village College’s Prevent Risk Assessment and Action Plan, for 
example, refer to the expression of ‘anti-British sentiments’ as extremism. These seemingly 
protective measures deny students an opportunity to be exposed to controversial speakers 
thereby removing possibilities for rigorous debate in a safe and balanced environment, a 
process that can help reduce radicalisation (Sedgwick, 2010).  
 
Reporting and Referrals through Prevent 
The final stage of the Prevent duty is the referral mechanism that obliges schools to make 
referrals if they are concerned that an individual might be vulnerable to radicalisation. These 
referrals are typically made by school safeguarding officers in conjunction with the head 
teacher before being received by a Prevent officer or the Channel Police Practitioner (CPP).  
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The Channel process draws on the existing collaboration between local authorities, the 
police, statutory partners (such as the education sector, social services, children’s and 
youth services and offender management services) and the local community. Based on 
referrals of ‘potentially at-risk’ individuals from schools and other organisations, the Channel 
process will assess the nature and extent of that risk and develop the most appropriate 
support for the individuals concerned (HM Government, 2012; 2015b). Since the introduction 
of the Prevent duty the number of young people referred to Channel has increased 
dramatically. A 75% increase in the first year, including a doubling of referrals from schools 
(Open Society Justice Initiative, 2016), demonstrates the impact of the duty on referrals. 
However, while referrals have increased, it is unclear how many of those young people were 
later found to be at risk of radicalised behaviour. 
There are a number of related concerns that have been raised in relation to referrals to 
Channel, many of them an extension to concerns raised earlier in the process about increased 
surveillance and securitisation. These mostly centre on the subjective and inconsistent nature 
of referral decisions, the stigmatising effect of referrals on students and communities, and 
the additional pressure on teachers. 
Busher at al (2017) highlighted the inconsistent nature of referral decisions amongst their 
respondents. They reported a range of opinions from respondents, including those that were 
less likely to refer a child after a risk-related comment, believing decisions must be based on 
common sense and professional judgement, those that thought it best to refer when in doubt, 
and those who would refer a student based on an inappropriate comment despite a certainty 
that no risk was present (Busher at al, 2017). Again this comes back to the lack of agreed 
definition of extremism and signs of radicalisation discussed earlier in the chapter.  
Further research is required before a full picture of teachers’ decision making in the report 
and referral process is clear. However, early indications suggest that there may be a wide pool 
of influential factors including fear of missing something important, pressures from Ofsted 
and governors to fulfil the duty, experience in the profession, personal biographies and 
general cultural and religious awareness, as well as the academic potential of the student. 
Concerns about the impact of an incorrect referral on the young person concerned may also, 
in some cases be a factor (Busher et al, 2017; Deakin and Acik, 2017). The extent of the 
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inconsistencies in safeguarding referrals is staggering, with the more extreme examples 
hitting the headlines of daily newspapersv. 
Surveillance under Prevent has been felt disproportionately by Muslim students (Busher, 
2017) and the referral process, in particular, carries significant potential for unfairly labelling 
or stigmatising Muslim students, especially those targeted for intervention who may not pose 
a genuine risk. This type of negative and stigmatising label serves to alienate and ostracise 
those who are labelled from the rest of society and may actually strengthen an anti-social 
identity (Muncie, 1999). In the case of those referred to Channel the risk of ‘false positive 
assessments’ is high: there are likely to be many young people referred to Channel who pose 
no risk of being radicalised (estimates are about 90% (Adams, 2016)). These false positives 
can have negative consequences for children, parents, and communities (Heath-Kelly, 2012). 
Finally, the necessity to make value judgements about students as part of reporting and 
referral, have contributed to concerns about the pressures teachers face throughout the 
process (Hindle, 2016). Teacher unions have objected to teachers being used, in counter-
terror measures, as agents of the state (Davies, 2016) and teachers have expressed their 
anger with the referral process, arguing that it puts them in an ethically and logistically 
difficult situation (Deakin and Acik, 2017). Many teachers agree that the duty to report makes 
it more difficult to create a school environment in which white British staff can get on well 
with students from different backgrounds, arguing that this ‘is likely to exacerbate the 
stigmatisation of Muslim students’ (Busher at al, 2017). 
Specifically, a minority of teachers worried that they might miss something important, or fail 
to report a piece of critical information with the associated implications for public safety and 
for the reputation of the school. (Deakin and Acik, 2017). More commonly teachers expressed 
concern about reporting students for the referral process. Specifically they expressed concern 
about stigmatising Muslim students, being perceived as racist, criminalising a bad joke, 
damaging relationships with children, shutting down lines of communication with their 
students and ‘being forced to participate in something damaging and morally wrong’ (Deakin 
and Acik, 2017). Referring a student under Prevent makes teachers complicit in a ‘stigmatising 
agenda’ that demonises Muslim children and communities (Coppock and McGovern, 2014). 
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It is little wonder that many teachers felt they would rather avoid the sensitive and 
controversial issues of radicalisation and extremism altogether (Davies, 2016) 
The implications of Prevent  
The so-called ‘war on terror’ waged by the U.K. government has led to further increases in 
securitisation of U.K. schools, and provided justifications for the introduction of new forms 
of security, monitoring and control.  The Prevent duty positions schools as sites of potential 
risk requiring an institutional response in the form of increased surveillance, monitoring, 
reporting and security. These new forms of control are not without implications for those 
tasked with imposing them, for those on the receiving end or for wider communities. 
Furthermore, they contribute to the worrying global trend towards the hyper-securitisation 
of school practices that are experienced disproportionately by certain groups (see Taylor, 
this volume; Thomas, 2016). The discussion above has highlighted significant concerns 
raised in the literature about the implications of the Prevent strategy on students, teachers 
and communities. The stigma experienced by students on the receiving end of Prevent 
practices and the reinforcement of the concept of suspect communities (typically of Muslim 
heritage) have been central elements of the discussions amongst academics, teachers, 
teacher unions, think tanks and campaign groups. This final section draws together the 
messages from research on Prevent and points towards possibilities for future policy and 
practice.  
It’s still early days to give a comprehensive account of the impact of Prevent on school 
practices, teachers, students or communities. Most schools have fulfilled the basic criteria, 
including staff training, and have updated their policies in line with the Prevent duty. 
However, the implementation of Prevent is ‘inconsistent’ as are decisions to record 
information and refer young people to Channel, the de-radicalisation programme. Part of the 
government message - that Prevent should not constitute ‘an extra burden’ to teachers and 
schools - has not been borne out in practice. Teachers were concerned about managing their 
new tasks (Busher et al, 2017) especially fulfilling the surveillance and reporting duties of 
Prevent alongside their usual overly-burdensome workload (Deakin and Acik, 2017). Yet, the 
fact that Prevent is a legal responsibility may influence any mounting dissent, and gradually 
the additional surveillance will become embedded within every-day routines and accepted as 
normal (Busher et al, 2017). Although the available research only represents a snapshot of 
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experiences from the field, it, nevertheless, gives a first insight into how the policy has been 
received and implemented. Research on this is still ongoing.  
There is still very little available research that discusses the experiences of students and 
communities labelled as suspect, but evidence suggests that concerns about the stigmatising 
and silencing effects of the policy are not unfounded.  Clearly, processes that target Muslim 
populations are likely to increase speculative suspicion (Kundnani, 2014; Awan, 2012) and 
have a negative impact on community cohesion (Thomas, 2016). Students from these 
communities have felt increasingly stigmatised since the introduction of the Prevent duty 
(Busher at al, 2017). 
Overall, critics present a bleak picture of Prevent’s impact and, relatedly, of its effectiveness 
in reducing radicalisation, arguing that it is currently doing little to ‘educate against 
extremism’ (Davies, 2008) and has not been able to build youth resilience against extremism 
(Thomas, 2016). Prevent’s focus on securitised surveillance, particularly of Muslim youth has 
been seen as fundamental to its failure (Thomas, 2016; Kundnani, 2015). Instead, critics call 
for an objective, human-rights based approach to citizenship education with a focus on 
educating against extremism (Thomas, 2016; Kundnani, 2014; Davies, 2008). 
 “What is needed is less state surveillance and enforced conformity and more critical thinking 
and political empowerment. The role of the communities in countering terrorism is not to 
institute self-censorship but to confidently construct political spaces where young people can 
politicize their disaffection into visions of how the world might be better organised” 
(Kundnani 2014:. 289).  
Similarly, at a National Union of Teachers’ conference, Christine Blower, the general secretary 
said “Schools’ best contribution to countering any behaviour that could be a problem is by 
encouraging discussion. Some aspects of Prevent inhibit this and it is for this reason that we 
need a review of the strategy to find the right, and best way to protect children and young 
people” (Adams, 2016). 
Schools and external partners can rise to this challenge by engaging in a pedagogy that, 
through the taught curriculum and social daily interaction, allows young people to discuss and 
explore the desirable skills of a democratic society (Sieckelinck et al, 2015). For Prevent to be 
an effective tool in the armoury against home-grown radicalisation, securitised surveillance 
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must give way to a human-rights-based educational approach that, in open and free 
discussions, analyses inequalities and redresses discriminatory practices.  
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i In our recent exploratory study we carried out a series of art and drama workshops to discuss experiences of 
Prevent with a group of teachers and students in a Manchester school. Our intention was to explore the 
conversations that go on amongst students, and between students and staff about the issues surrounding 
radicalisation: how open and honest are these conversations, and how are these enabled or stifled by the 
enactment of the Prevent duty? (Deakin and Acik, 2017) 
ii Coppock refers specifically to ‘Learning together to be safe: a toolkit to help schools contribute to the 
prevention of violent extremism’ (Department of Children, Schools and Families, 2008) 
iii RadEqual is a campaign and grant programme co-designed between communities, Manchester City Council, 
Greater Manchester Police and The Foundation for Peace supporting community empowerment, resilience 
and inclusion. http://www.makingmanchestersafer.com/mms/homepage/22/radequal 
iv See for example  http://www.preventforfeandtraining.org.uk/p-curriculum-guidance-and-materials  ) 
v See for example the case of the 10 year old boy interviewed by police after writing that he lived in a ‘Terrorist 
house’ rather than a terraced house http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-3407915/Muslim-boy-writes-
lives-terrorist-house-accident-quizzed-police.html 
Or the examples of the 4 year old boy who was referred to Channel after drawing a picture of his father with a 




                                                             
